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The NAFTA Trucking Dispute: Pretexts for
Noncompliance and Policy Justifications




With the passage of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993, the United States and Mexico en-
visaged liberalization of restrictions pertaining to cross-border
services. Pursuant to Chapter 12 of NAFTA, these countries an-
ticipated the allowance of cross-border trucking, whereby com-
mercial vehicles would have the freedom to travel the entire
treaty region by the end of the millennium. This transportation
ideal notwithstanding, the United States has refused to permit
cross-border trucking, citing the allegedly unsafe nature of
Mexican trucks and drivers. A NAFTA arbitral panel recently
held that the United States must comply with its treaty obliga-
tions within a relatively short period.1 While the determination
of the arbitral panel allows the United States to impose differ-
ent requirements on Mexican trucks, such disparate treatment
must be (i) performed in good faith, (ii) implemented to protect a
legitimate safety concern, (iii) conducted on a case-by-case basis,
* Hale E. Sheppard (B.S. Journalism, with distinction, M.A. Latin American
Studies, with honors, J.D. - University of Kansas; Magister (L.L.M. equivalent) in
International Law, with highest distinction - University of Chile) is an attorney in
the Washington, D.C. office of Haynes and Boone, LLP. Mr. Sheppard works pri-
marily in the areas of trade regulation, customs, export controls and international
transactions.
1. See Final Report of the Arbitral Panel Established Pursuant to Chapter
Twenty in the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services, NAFTA, Secretariat File
No. U.S.A-MEX-98-2008-01, at para. 299 (Feb. 6, 2001), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/trucking.pdf [hereinafter Final Report].
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and (iv) fully compliant with all relevant NAFTA provisions. 2
In response to this mandate, the U.S. Department of Trans-
portation (DOT) has recently issued three regulations designed
to simultaneously ensure NAFTA compliance and safety on U.S.
roads (DOT Trucking Regulations).3 Despite the directive of the
arbitral panel and legislative efforts by the DOT, several opposi-
tion groups insist that the moratorium on cross-border trucking
must continue. They believe complete exclusion of Mexican ve-
hicles is the only method available to guarantee U.S. highway
safety.4 Through the use of fierce admonitions and apocalyptic
predictions regarding road safety, these groups have effectively
managed to convert the "NAFTA debate" of the early 1990s into
the "NAFTA implementation debate" of the year 2000.
Supporting the proposition that the United States should
take all necessary steps to facilitate cross-border trucking as
rapidly as possible, including the implementation of the DOT
Trucking Regulations, this article is organized in the following
manner. Part I provides a historical perspective of the dispute,
tracing the discussion from the concept of cross-border services
to the DOT reaction of the NAFTA arbitral panel's decision.
Part II discusses the truck-safety argument used by multiple
NAFTA opponents to substantiate continued disregard for U.S.
treaty obligations. Part III examines the potential ulterior mo-
tives that such NAFTA opposition groups may possess. Part IV
demonstrates that the United States has multiple reasons for
complying with NAFTA. On the basis of these arguments, Part
V of this article concludes that swift enactment and implemen-
tation of the DOT Trucking Regulations constitutes the most
pragmatic remedy.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE NAFTA
TRUCKING DISPUTE
A. A HISTORY OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MEXICAN TRUCKS
In 1982, Congress enacted the Bus Regulatory Reform Act,
which included a two year moratorium on the issuance of new
U.S. highway authorizations to trucks domiciled in a foreign
2. See id. at para. 301.
3. See discussion infra Part I.C.
4. See discussion infra Part II.A-C.
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country, or those owned or controlled by foreign persons.5 In
addition to imposing a trucking standstill, the Bus Regulatory
Reform Act authorized the President to eliminate or otherwise
modify the legislation, provided that such action was in the na-
tional interest.6 The cessation applied to Mexico and Canada,
but was immediately lifted for Canada pursuant to a presiden-
tial memorandum indicating that Canadian safety standards
were equal or superior to those existing in the United States.7
Despite the longstanding restriction on Mexico, certain excep-
tions were made to facilitate cross-border trade, including the
ability of Mexican trucks to operate within designated commer-
cial zones in the four border states of California, Arizona, New
Mexico and Texas.8
Discussions between the United States, Mexico and Canada
concerning NAFTA began in 1990. In August 1992, the three
countries announced that they had reached a comprehensive
agreement, which included provisions designed to gradually lib-
eralize cross-border trucking throughout the continent. Annex I
provided that Mexican trucks would be permitted to operate in
the four U.S. border states by December 18th, 1995.9 Annex I
provided, furthermore, that Mexican trucks would be allowed to
operate throughout the entire United States on January 1,
2000.10
Prior to these pivotal dates, the United States indicated
5. See 49 C.F.R. pt. 368 (1982).
6. See 49 U.S.C. § 13902(c)(1982).
7. See Presidential Memorandum, 47 Fed. Reg. 41,721 (Sept. 22, 1982)
[hereinafter Memorandum]. In the president's opinion, "our national interest is
best served by fair and equitable competition between the United States and
Canadian trucking interests in our two markets." Id.
8. See Off. of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Transp. Audit Report: Mexico-
Domiciled Motor Carriers, Rep. No. TR-2000-013 (Nov. 4, 1999), available at
httpJ/www.oig.dot.gov/item-details.php?item=220 [hereinafter DOT Report
1999]. While ninety-eight percent of Mexican trucks were restricted to operat-
ing in the commercial zones, the remaining two percent retained the right to
travel throughout the entire United States under one of the following excep-
tions: (i) Mexico-domiciled trucks that have U.S. citizens as majority owners,
(ii) Mexico-domiciled, Mexican-owned trucks "grandfathered" because they re-
ceived operating authority prior to the enactment of the Bus Regulatory Reform
Act, and (iii) Mexico-domiciled, Mexican-owned trucks that use the United
States as a "land bridge" to Canada, without stopping to load or unload cargo.
See id.
9. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 18, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057,
23 I.L.M. 605 (stating that Mexican trucks would be permitted to operate in the
four U.S. border states three years after the signing of the NAFTA agreement)
[hereinafter NAFTA].
10. See id. at Annex I.
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that it intended to uphold its treaty obligations in a timely fash-
ion. For instance, while announcing certain measures to facili-
tate the implementation of the NAFTA trucking provisions, the
Secretary of the DOT stated that "[i]t is clear that this Decem-
ber [1995] will mark a visible, fundamental change in the way
trade and commerce is conducted in our hemisphere... the
United States is determined that NAFTA is enacted properly
and works right for each of our countries."11 The United States
changed its position soon afterward. On December 18th, 1995,
the U.S. Secretary of the DOT explained that documentation
from Mexican truckers would be stalled, and "final disposition of
pending applications will be held until those consultations [on
safety and security issues] have been completed." 12
The Mexican government reacted by implementing a series
of maneuvers provided for in NAFTA to resolve the quarrel ex-
peditiously. It requested formal consultations with the United
States pursuant to Chapter 20 of NAFTA, which were held in
January 1996.13 The dispute was not resolved, and Mexico re-
quested a meeting in July 1998 with the Free Trade Commis-
sion in accordance with Article 2007 of NAFTA. 14 The parties
were unable to reach a resolution at this stage, forcing Mexico to
solicit the formation of an arbitral panel in September 1998
(NAFTA Panel) as provided for in NAFTA Article 2008.15
While this dispute continued unresolved, the United States
failed to adhere to the January 1, 2000, NAFTA deadline, which
11. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Pefia Announces Key Measures
for Smooth, Safe and Efficient NAFTA Transition (Sept.5, 1995) (on file with
author) [hereinafter NAFTA Transition].
12. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Remarks Prepared for Delivery:
NAFTA Border Opening Remarks (Dec. 18, 1995) (on file with author) [herein-
after Border Remarks].
13. See John M. Nagel, NAFTA: U.S.-Mexico Consultations to Continue on
Trucking, Tomato Quota, SECOFI Says, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 102 (Jan.
24, 1996), available at http://www.bna.com/products/corplaw/itr.htm (on file
with author); See also NAFTA, supra note 9, at art. 2006 (providing that "[any
party may request in writing consultations with any other Party regarding any
actual or proposed measure or any other matter that it considers might affect
the operation of this Agreement").
14. See NAFTA, supra note 9, at art. 2007 (dictating that if the consulting
parties are unable to resolve the matter within thirty days of the request for
consultation, then any Party may request in writing a meeting with the [Free
Trade] Commission).
15. See id., art. 2008 (establishing that if the Free Trade Commission con-
venes and does not resolve the matter within thirty days then any consulting
Party may request in writing the establishment of an arbitral panel).
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would have given Mexican trucks access to all American roads.' 6
Similar to the justifications offered for noncompliance in 1995,
the United States claimed that inadequate safety regulations
and enforcement in Mexico warranted the extension of the
moratorium against Mexican trucks. 7 Although the DOT ac-
knowledged improvements in the Mexican system, the disparity
in safety standards between the two nations was still too formi-
dable.'8 Upon announcing its intention to disregard the second
NAFTA deadline, representatives of the DOT summarily stated
that "[w]e've made good progress [but] we're simply not there
yet."'19 President Clinton also announced an indefinite prolonga-
tion of the trucking moratorium due to the difficulty of ensuring
compliance with U.S. safety standards.20 After a period of addi-
tional tactical submissions and requests, the NAFTA Panel duly
conducted the arbitration in May 2000, and a final report
thereof was issued in February 2001.21
B. THE NAFTA PANEL DECISION
In a unanimous decision against the United States, the
NAFTA Panel held that the blanket refusal by the United
States to review and consider applications from Mexican trucks
for cross-border services constituted a breach of Annex I of
NAFTA. 22 The NAFTA Panel described the arguments of the
United States as "unpersuasive" and refused to entertain any ex
post facto, self-serving justifications. 23 The report stated, in par-
ticular, that:
[t]he fact that the United States may not have available, for budgetary
or other reasons, 'safety investigators' to travel to Mexico, is not an ex-
cuse to fail to comply with U.S. obligations under the [NAFTA] Agree-
ment, particularly given the fact that Mexican regulatory conditions
were well-known to the United States at least since September 1992,
when NAFTA negotiations were completed.24
16. See Rossella Brevetti, DOT to Continue Current Policy Limiting Mexi-
can Truck Access, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 16 (Jan. 6, 2000), available at




20. Clinton Promises Teamsters to Keep Border Closed, 19 WASH. TARIFF &
TRADE LETTER 1 (Oct. 11, 1999) (on file with author).
21. See generally Final Report, supra note 1.
22. See id. at para. 295.
23. Id. at para. 273.
24. Id.
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Based on its findings, the NAFTA Panel mandated that the
United States take "appropriate steps" to bring its practices re-
garding cross-border trucking services into compliance with its
obligations under NAFTA.25
C. DOT TRUCKING REGULATIONS
True to its established pattern, the United States failed to
take "appropriate steps" to rectify the situation within the allot-
ted thirty day period.26 President George W. Bush, however,
made several unambiguous statements that his administration
would take all feasible measures to make the country NAFTA-
compliant by, at the latest, January 1, 2002.27 Shortly after the
NAFTA Panel decision, the Bush administration announced
that "[we have assured the Mexican government that we intend
to live up to our NAFTA obligations to open the U.S.-Mexico
border to trucking [and] [dliscussions are underway on how to
implement the recent NAFTA Panel decision in a safe and or-
derly fashion."28 The White House stated that a one-year wait-
ing period would (i) allow Congress time to appropriate the nec-
essary funds in the 2001-2002 budget to implement the new
measures and (ii) grant the DOT sufficient opportunity to enact
regulations aimed at ensuring safety compliance. 29 As a result
of these gestures of good will, Mexico initially announced that it
would not impose trade sanctions on the United States as long
as conciliatory efforts continued.30
In accordance with the Bush administration's announce-
ment, in May 2001 the DOT Trucking Regulations were intro-
duced.31 Upon presentation for public comment, the U.S. Secre-
tary of the DOT reiterated that the proposed guidelines were a
direct reflection of the Bush administration's adherence to the
25. Final Report, supra note 1, at para. 299.
26. David Hendricks, Mexican Trucks Can Roll; White House Clears Road
for Deliveries to Interior of the U.S., SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS NEWS, Apr. 5, 2001,
at Al, available at http://www.mysanantonio.com (last visited Feb. 13, 2002).
27. See id.
28. Alan Larson, Under Secretary, U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Outlines Po-
tential for Expanded U.S.-Mexico Trade, Remarks Before the 54th Plenary of
the Mexico-U.S. Business Committee (Mar. 5, 2001), at http://www.
usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/mexico/larson5.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2002).
29. See Hendricks, supra note 26.
30. See U.S. Misses Deadline for Mexican Truck Access; Safety Concerns
Postpone Policy Required by NAFTA, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Mar. 8, 2001,
at A13.
31. See 49 C.F.R. pt. 365.
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NAFTA Panel ruling. He stated that "President Bush has made
a firm commitment to implement NAFTA trucking provisions,
and his Administration has begun doing that. 32
The DOT Trucking Regulations are comprised of three
separate parts.33 The first regulation introduces new procedures
designed to ensure that Mexican trucking companies, trucks
and drivers comply with U.S. safety standards in order to attain
authorization to operate in the four border states of California,
Arizona, New Mexico and Texas.34 Each Mexican applicant
must, among other things, certify that it has in place a system
to guarantee compliance with U.S. requirements related to (i)
driver qualifications, (ii) hours of service, (iii) insurance cover-
age levels, (iv) drug and alcohol testing, (v) truck condition, (vi)
accident monitoring, and (vii) hazardous materials transporta-
tion.35 The second DOT Trucking Regulation sets forth similar
rules and requirements for permits to operate beyond the border
states.36 Finally, the third regulation establishes a supplemen-
tary safety oversight program, whereby government officials
may conduct roadside inspections and on-site compliance re-
views at the headquarters of a Mexican trucking company.37 In
order to meet the requirements of the NAFTA Panel decision
mandating immediate compliance with the treaty, the DOT
Trucking Regulations dictate that Mexican trucks may obtain
an initial provisional authorization on the basis of a legal affi-
davit pledging that all the necessary safety conditions have been
met.38 A thorough inspection of the trucking facilities, vehicles
and drivers, however, is required within eighteen months of re-
ceipt of the temporary permit.39
32. Rossella Brevetti, DOT Proposes Rules to Open U.S. to Mexican Truck-
ing Entities, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 714 (May 3, 2001), available at
http://www.bna.com/products/corplaw/itr.htm (on file with author).
33. See id.
34. See generally Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 66 Fed.
Reg. 86,22328 (May 3, 2001) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 368 & 387).
35. Id. at 86,22330.
36. See id. at 86,22371.
37. See id. at 86,22415. The regulations specify that the measures in-
cluded in these new regulations will fortify the existing system. It is stated
specifically that "we wish to emphasize that the safety oversight program is in-
tended to supplement, not replace, the regular safety fitness compliance and
enforcement procedures applicable to all motor carriers within our jurisdiction."
Id. at 86,22417.
38. See id. at 86,22416.
39. See id.
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D. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO THE DOT
The DOT Trucking Regulations faced immediate Congres-
sional opposition. Approximately one month after publication of
these proposed rules, the U.S. House of Representatives ap-
proved an amendment (Sabo Amendment), "[d]ealing a blow to
the [Bush] administration's free trade agenda."40 The House
overwhelmingly approved the amendment, which effectively
precludes the expenditure of U.S. government funds to process
any applications by Mexican truckers.41 In light of the recent
NAFTA Panel decision holding that the United States' refusal to
review applications from Mexican trucks was a clear breach of
the treaty, the author of the Sabo Amendment admitted that
this legislation was questionable. 42  He explained that "the
amendment that we had earlier clearly was NAFTA-compliant.
This [the Sabo Amendment] probably is not, because it is a total
prohibition, but I know of no other way for us to deal with this
40. Heather Rothman & Rossella Brevetti, House Bars Funds for Process-
ing of Mexican Truck Applications in U.S., 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1002
(June 28, 2001), available at httpJ/www.bna.com/products/corplaw/itr.htm (on
file with author).
41. Comments on Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Ap-
propriations Act, 2002, Daily Digest at H3586-H3594 (June 26, 2001), available
at http://thomas.loc.gov/r107/rlO7d26jnl.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2002) [here-
inafter Comments]. Distraught by the fact that the DOT Trucking Regulations
would allow Mexican trucks to operate in the United States for up to eighteen
months without first satisfying U.S. safety standards, Representative Martin
Sabo (Democrat - Minnesota) initially introduced a less stringent amendment
that simply precluded funding for the DOT Regulations, unless safety require-
ments were satisfied before granting Mexican trucks a Certificate of Registra-
tion. The original language stated, in particular, that:
[nlo funding limited in this Act for the review or processing of applica-
tions by Mexican motor carriers for conditional authority to operate
beyond U.S. municipalities and commercial zones on the U.S.-Mexico
border may be obligated unless the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Ad-
ministration has adopted and implemented as part of its review proce-
dures... a requirement that each Mexican motor carrier seeking au-
thority to operate beyond U.S. municipalities and commercial zones on
the U.S.-Mexico border undergo a new entrant safety evaluation com-
pliance review consistent with the safety fitness procedures . .. and re-
ceive a minimum rating of satisfactory before being granted such con-
ditional operating authority.
Id. at H3589.
Due to the fact that this original version was not voted on due to procedural
wrangling, Representative Sabo felt forced to introduce the Sabo Amendment,
which contained a complete ban on funding. See id.
42. See id. at H3586.
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issue on the floor."43 Other members of the House, in contrast,
seemed wholly unconcerned with the validity of the legislation
and lobbied fervently for upholding U.S. safety standards at all
costs. In the words of one representative, "NAFTA is a trade
agreement. It is not a suicide pact. We are not required to al-
low unsafe trucks on American highways in order to satisfy
some pencil-happy bureaucrat dealing with NAFTA."44
Compared to the radical Sabo Amendment, the legislation
introduced in the U.S. Senate (Murray Amendment) in reaction
to the DOT Trucking Regulations was portrayed as more of a
"common sense compromise" on the issue.45 From the perspec-
tive of the bill's author, it is a compromise between the "laissez-
faire" approach of the Bush administration that permits Mexi-
can trucks in the United States and reviews them up to eighteen
months later and the "strict-protectionist" approach of the
House of Representatives that endeavors to exclude all Mexican
trucks without reviewing any of them.46 Proponents of the
Murray Amendment rely on a liberal interpretation of the
NAFTA Panel decision such that complete parity in terms of
trucking provisions is not compulsory under the treaty. It is ar-
gued that "[w]hile the DOT has stated that it is seeking to treat
U.S., Mexican and Canadian trucks in the same way, the fact is
that we are not required to treat them in the same way. Where
greater safety risks exist, we are entitled, under NAFTA, to im-
pose stricter safety conditions."47
The Murray Amendment has numerous requirements, in-
cluding: (i) complete safety audits of Mexican trucks conducted
before the issuance of authorizations to operate in the United
States; (ii) performance of safety compliance reviews at trucking
company headquarters in Mexico instead of at the border to en-
sure access to all necessary documentation; (iii) placement of
weigh-in-motion machines at all border crossings; (iv) attain-
ment of ample coverage from a U.S. insurer; (v) promulgation
and implementation of all relevant DOT regulations before al-
lowing any Mexican trucks to cross the border; and (vi) con-
43. Id.
44. Id. at H3587.
45. Heather M. Rothman, Senate Passes Transportation Bill; Showdown in
September on Mexican Trucks, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1269 (Aug. 9, 2001),
available at http://www.bna.com/products/corplaw/itr.htm (on file with author).
46. Id.
47. Press Release, Patty Murray, U.S. Senator, Remarks by Senator
Murray on Ensuring the Safety of Mexican Trucks (July 24, 2001) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Murray].
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struction of additional border inspection facilities.48 Contrary to
the drafter of the Sabo Amendment, who concedes that his bill
likely violates NAFTA, supporters of the Murray Amendment
staunchly defend the validity of the proposed language.49 Sena-
tor Murray maintains that:
[tihis bill won't violate NAFTA. The arbitration panel already told us
that we can take steps to ensure our safety. Let me repeat that. The
official panel that determines compliance with NAFTA has already
told us we can take the safety measures we need. This bill does not
violate NAFTA.50
Dissatisfied with the Murray Amendment, yet another bill
was introduced, the Gramm/McCain Nondiscrimination
Amendment. The authors of this bill suggest that the Murray
Amendment is substandard for multiple reasons. The proposed
Murray language would violate NAFTA because it forces the
United States to discriminate against Mexican truckers. 51
While acknowledging that the NAFTA Panel decision allows the
United States to establish "different" methods of treating trucks
from Canada and Mexico, those championing the
Gramm/McCain Nondiscrimination Amendment argue it does
not give the United States carte blanche to discriminate against
Mexican trucks.5 2 They contend, in particular, that the Murray
Amendment "would be a direct violation of NAFTA [since] [i]t
effectively provides a blanket prohibition from allowing any
Mexican motor carrier from operating beyond the commercial
zones."53 Advocates of the Gramm/McCain Nondiscrimination
Act also insist that the majority of the provisions in the Murray
Amendment are unfeasible or nonsensical. 54 The mandate that
48. S. 1178, 107th Cong. § 343 (2001) (regarding the safety of cross-border
trucking between the U.S. and Mexico).
49. See Murray, supra note 47, at 3.
50. Id.
51. See Press Release, John McCain, U.S. Senator, McCain Issues State-




54. See Press Release, John McCain, U.S. Senator, McCain Issues State-
ment on NAFTA Trucking (July 24, 2001) (on file with author). As an example,
the statement suggests that requiring the installation of a weigh-in-motion ap-
paratus at each crossing would be extremely expensive, time-consuming and
unnecessary, particularly since stationary weigh stations are already located
throughout nearly every state. Id. The statement additionally points out that
forcing Mexican truckers to acquire coverage from an American insurer is ab-
surd since such a rule would exclude an array of major international insurers
that deal precisely in this area and already insure many Canadian trucks, such
[Vo1.11:235
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requires all DOT regulations be fully implemented before allow-
ing Mexican trucks to operate in the United States caught the
attention of one critic who suggested that such language "is as
arbitrary as saying Mexican trucks cannot operate in the United
States until the 29th of February falls on a Tuesday."55
The final reason the Murray Amendment is deemed inade-
quate is that opponents on both sides of the border believe that
it would be contrary to the "spirit" of the treaty.56 These argu-
ments against the Murray Amendment notwithstanding, the
GrammlMcCain Nondiscrimination Act was overwhelmingly re-
jected, managing to capture the vote of only thirty-five senators.
In reaction to the rejection of the Gramm/McCain Nondiscrimi-
nation Act, certain senators vowed to collaborate with the White
House and Congress to reach an acceptable compromise regard-
ing the NAFTA trucking dispute. 57 Failing this, the Bush ad-
ministration has repeatedly threatened to veto any action that
prevents Mexican trucks from operating on U.S. roads.58
as Lloyds of London. Id.; see also Anitha Reddy & Helen Dewar, DOT Against
Inspection of Trucks in Mexico, WASH. POST, July 19, 2001, at E2 (noting the
DOT agrees that certain provisions in the Murray Amendment, i.e., those re-
quiring on-site inspection of Mexican trucking facilities in Mexico, are unrealis-
tic for logistical and economic reasons).
55. Rothman, supra note 45.
56. Philip Shenon, Senate Backs Strict Safety Tests for Mexican Trucks in
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2001, at A14; see also Yadir Mena, Bloqueo a
camiones mexicanos viola el espiritu del TLCAN, EL ECONOMISTA, Aug. 1, 2001
(on file with author).
57. See Helen Dewar, Senate Passes Safety Rules for Mexican Trucks,
WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2001, at A19.
58. Bush Vows Veto of Limits on Mexican Trucks, WASH. POST, July 12,
2001, at A17; see also White House Threatens Veto Over Restrictions on Mexican
Trucks, THE BULLETIN'S FRONTRUNNER, July 12, 2001 (on file with author);
John Nagel, et al., U.S.T.R. Reassures Mexico on NAFTA Truck Ban After
Threat of Sanctions on U.S. Corn Syrup, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1041 (July
5, 2001), available at http://www.bna.comlproducts/corplaw/itr.htm (on file with
author). Political analysts suggest that a compromise on this NAFTA imple-
mentation issue is inevitable due to the pressures generated by each legislators'
constituents. In other words, the Bush Administration and Congress must
eventually reach an agreement "to keep federal funds flowing for popular high-
way, transit, bridge and aviation projects in every lawmaker's state or district."
Dewar, supra note 57.
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II. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST CROSS-BORDER
TRUCKING: SAFETY
A. THE GOVERNMENT REPORT TRILOGY
The primary justification espoused to disregard NAFTA
deadlines and preclude Mexican trucks from operating in the
United States is that Mexican vehicles and their drivers are un-
safe.59 Some interest groups have passionately argued that al-
lowing Mexican trucks to enter the United States would be tan-
tamount to blessing the "inevitable future crashes [that] will
lead to additional loss of life and to a massive public backlash
against NAFTA."60 Some legislators also believe that cross-
border trucking would cause American roads to be more danger-
ous.61 Upon sending a letter to President Bush commenting on
the proposed DOT Trucking Regulations, these legislators in-
sisted that access be denied to all Mexican trucks "until the
safety of the operator and the traveling public can be fully as-
sured. '62 The basis for these beliefs relies in part on three major
studies conducted by U.S. government agencies.
In 1996, the General Accounting Office published a report
wherein the chief discrepancies between U.S. and Mexican
commercial trucking regulations and operating practices were
identified. 63 In concluding that there existed "major differences"
between the applicable rules that may have an impact on high-
way safety and infrastructure, the report pinpointed several ar-
eas in which incongruities existed, including: (i) limits on con-
59. See generally supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
60. The Coming NAFTA Crash: The Deadly Impact of a Secret NAFTA Tri-
bunal's Decision to Open U.S. Highways to Unsafe Mexican Trucks, PUB.
CITIZEN GLOBAL TRADE WATCH, (Feb. 1, 2001), at http://www.citizen.org/ publi-
cations/release.cfm?ID=6839 [hereinafter Global Trade Watch].
61. Letter to President George W. Bush from John Kerry, Max Baucus,
Jeff Bingaman, Tom Harkin, Tom Daschle, Ron Wyden, Ted Kennedy, Evan
Bayh, Dick Durbin and Joe Lieberman (June 11, 2001), at
http'//www.trucksafety. orgldltobush.html.
62. See id.
63. See GAO, Commercial Trucking: Safety and Infrastructure Issues Un-
der the North American Free Trade Agreement, GAO/RCED-96-61, at 12 (Feb.
29, 1996), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/rc96061.pdf [hereinaf-
ter G.A.O. Report 19961.
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secutive hours of service, with the ten hour maximum in the
United States absent from Mexican regulations; (ii) drivers in
the United States must maintain accurate logbooks while their
Mexican counterparts are not required to do so; (iii) U.S. trucks
produced after 1980 are obligated to maintain front brakes,
while Mexican trucks of equal age do not necessarily have this
feature; and (iv) Mexican trailers are allowed to carry twenty
percent more cargo under comparative maximum weight restric-
tions.64 With regard to the condition of the Mexican trucks
themselves, the report calculates that fifty percent of vehicles
attempting to cross the border are "in poor condition and do not
meet any U.S. safety standards for trucks."6
A second report, conducted by the DOT in 1998, focused its
criticisms primarily on the shortage of border inspection facili-
ties and personnel. 66 According to this study there is a strong
correlation (for economic reasons) between the number of in-
spectors and the condition of the Mexican trucks that seek ad-
mittance to U.S. roads.67 For a Mexican company, having one of
its trucks placed out-of-service at the border is a significant ex-
pense because of towing costs for extensive violations, the cost of
mechanical repairs, contractual penalties associated with late
deliveries, and costs incurred to transfer the cargo to another
truck.68 A "more robust" inspection presence will serve as an in-
centive to improve compliance because of strong economic con-
sequences to those Mexican companies whose trucks are placed
out-of-service. 69
Conducted in 1999 by the DOT, a third report highlighted
that Mexican trucks were found violating the law by entering
the United States without first obtaining the requisite permit
and by exceeding the scope of authority granted. 70 In addition to
repeating earlier criticisms regarding the insufficiency of border
facilities and inspectors, this document underscored the weak
penalties imposed on Mexican trucks found transgressing the
64. Id. at 3.
65. Id. at 4.
66. See OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. AUDIT REPORT:
Motor Carrier Safety Program for Commercial Trucks at U.S. Borders, Rep. No.
TR-1999-034 (Dec. 23, 1998), available at http://www.oig.dot.gov/showpdf.
php?id=264 [hereinafter DOT Report 1998].
67. See id. at 4.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 3.
70. See DOT Report 1999, supra note 8, at 3 (noting how some Mexican
trucks operated outside the designated commercial zones in the border states).
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law.7 1 Due to the relatively low punitive force of these sanc-
tions, U.S. transportation laws have been virtually ineffectual:
"[Mexican] motor carriers are likely to consider the fines to be a
cost of doing business. '72
Analyzed in conjunction with the NAFTA Panel decision
and the DOT Trucking Regulations, these three governmental
studies have led multiple groups to argue that U.S. adherence to
its NAFTA obligations would jeopardize the safety of the Ameri-
can public. Although delivered at varying levels of intensity,
each group spearheaded campaigns to prolong the moratorium
against Mexican trucks in the name of preeminence of safety on
American highways. The strongest opposition groups include
public interest organizations and organized labor.
B. PUBLIC INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS
Public Citizen has situated itself at the forefront of public
interest NAFTA trucking opposition.73 In a paper generated in
response to the NAFTA Panel decision, the organization argues
that ensuring the safety of American motorists by inspecting
each Mexican truck is unrealistic since current resources allow
only one percent of Mexican trucks to be inspected at the bor-
der.74 Furthermore, the expansion of NAFTA trucking would be
catastrophic for U.S. towns located on the border.7 5 The paper
contends, in particular, that "NAFTA has concentrated these
underpaid, overworked [Mexican] drivers in the border areas.
71. See id. at 7.
72. Id. To substantiate the claim that penalties are rarely imposed on
Mexican trucks caught violating U.S. traffic laws, this report indicates that (i)
only three percent of Mexican trucks operating without permits were subjected
to enforcement actions, (ii) absolutely no sanctions were imposed on Mexican
trucks found operating illegally beyond the commercial zones, (iii) the fines ap-
plicable in the four border states are inconsistent, and (iv) fines are relatively
low for first-time violations, i.e., between $500 and $1,000. See id.
73. This advocacy group has published a multiplicity of articles in opposi-
tion of the recent NAFTA Panel ruling. See, e.g., NAFTA Truck Ruling Imperils
U.S. Public Safety, PUB. CITIZEN (Nov. 29, 2000), at http://www.citizen.org/
pressroom/release.cfm?ID=490 (on file with author); Recent Mexican Trucking
Rules Do Not Solve Serious Safety Hazards: NAFTA Ruling Could Expose U.S.
Public to Dangerous Cross-Border Trucks, PUB. CITIZEN (Feb. 7, 2001) (on file
with author); Mexican Truck Inspection Program Sorely Lacking, Allows Trucks
with Faulty Brakes, Leaky Fuel Lines to Stay on Road, PUB. CITIZEN (Feb. 7,
2001), at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=710 (on file with au-
thor).




There, the lucrative temptations of transporting narcotics, un-
documented migrants, and contraband, like weapons and stolen
cars, contribute to a border area that is more like the Wild West
than the modern West."76
After reciting the major flaws with the Mexican trucking
industry that were identified in the three governmental studies
mentioned above, Public Citizen advocates that the United
States continue to violate its NAFTA obligations by closing its
border until an ever-elusive consensus is reached in Washington
regarding safety standards. 77 In the meantime, they contend,
the United States should opt to pay the fine for noncompliance. 78
As explained in the report:
This means that the Bush administration must resolve the current
case by agreeing to pay the NAFTA sanctions and continue to limit ac-
cess until there is a meaningful Mexican truck safety system. Other-
wise, the public will learn, painfully and first-hand, the dangers that
an anti-democratic and anti-safety decision by a secret international
trade tribunal can bring to its front door.79
Along with Public Citizen, other public interest groups have ac-
tively lobbied for disregarding NAFTA obligations until more
stringent safety measures are in place.80
C. ORGANIZED LABOR
1. Teamsters
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Teamsters)
also advocates a complete ban on Mexican trucks.81 Citing the
76. Id.
77. See id. (arguing that the NAFTA Panel's decision will force the opening
of the border "far too soon and that the border should remain closed until there
is a consensus that meaningful safety standards and oversight are in place).
78. See Global Trade Watch, supra note 60.
79. Id.
80. Other notable groups include Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety
and Citizens for Reliable Safe Highways. See, e.g., Submission to the Docket of
the U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Motor Carrier Safety Admini-
stration on the Proposed Rules to Ensure Safety of Mexican Trucks and Buses,
CITIZENS FOR RELIABLE AND SAFE HIGHWAYS (CRASH) (May 18, 2001), at
http'//www.trucksafety.org/nftadkt.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2002).
81. See Press Release, Teamsters, Inspector General's Report Confirms
U.S. Is Not Ready to Open Border with Mexico (May 10, 2001) (on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter Teamsters 2001]; see also Press Release, Teamsters, ABC
Nightline Reveals DEA Hid Information on Mexican Drug Smuggling During
1993 NAFTA Debate (May 8, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter Teamsters
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"abysmal inspection statistics" of Mexican trucks and the poten-
tial negative repercussions such as endangering American driv-
ers, eliminating thousands of U.S. jobs, facilitating drug smug-
gling and imperiling the environment, the Teamsters have
zealously lobbied against cross-border trucking.8 2 To fortify this
argument and engender public support for its position, the
Teamsters have disseminated several documents referencing po-
tential safety risks. One news release, which epitomizes the
disparagement commonly used by this labor union to bolster its
standpoint, is overtly critical of many aspects of cross-border
trucking.8 3 It states that "[w]ith Mexican truckers, we have a
double whammy--not only are they screwing us by bringing in
more dope, but there is the matter of truck safety. They fix
things with bubble gum and tape."84 Other news releases at-
tempt to instill fear in American drivers with nightmarish sce-
narios and rhetorical questions:
Right now, we have unsafe Mexican trucks and drivers on highways all
across the United States. Do you want to be driving in Michigan or
Colorado or New York with your family and have the tractor-trailer
coming up behind you driven by a sixteen-year-old making six dollars a
day? Do you want that truck to be so unsafe that the wheels can fall
off at any time?n
Akin to the solution proposed by the public interest organi-
zations, the Teamsters advocate a provisional blockage of the
border until stricter safety standards are imposed. They also
advocate ignoring the fines that the United States will be forced
to pay Mexico.8 6 According to a Teamsters' spokesperson, "[i]t
doesn't matter whether this faceless NAFTA panel fines the
U.S. $1 million or $10 million... You can't put a price on hu-
man life."8
1997].
82. Teamsters 2001, supra note 81.
83. See Press Release, Teamsters, The NAFTA Trucker (May 10, 2001) (on
file with author).
84. Id.
85. Press Release, Teamsters, Cross-Border Press Conference 6/24199
James P. Hoff General President, International Brotherhood of Teamsters
(June 24, 1999) (on file with author).
86. See Press Release, Teamsters, Teamsters and Rep. Brown Decry
NAFTA Panel's Proposal to Diminish U.S. Safety Laws: NAFTA Panel Ex-
pected to Overturn U.S. Public Safety Laws (Sept. 28, 2000) (on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter Press Release].




Relying primarily on the argument that the value of a hu-
man life is incalculable, labor organizations like the American
Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-
CIO) have pressured the Bush administration to disregard the
mandate from the NAFTA Panel despite the economic conse-
quences.88 Based on the three studies conducted by the U.S.
government identifying potential safety problems with Mexican
trucks, the AFL-CIO questions the functionality of the DOT
Trucking Regulations issued in response to the NAFTA Panel
decision.8 9 Such recurrent findings, it is argued, cannot be sur-
passed by simple political persuasion: "years of well documented
safety evidence cannot be negated by a photo op earlier this year
between President Bush and President Fox."90
III. ULTERIOR MOTIVES OF OPPOSITION GROUPS
The heavy reliance on the safety issue is attributable in
part to its sensational nature that grabs and maintains the pub-
lic's attention.9 1 Currently, there is an alleged "death watch" be-
ing conducted by NAFTA opponents, who are anxiously await-
ing the first incident in which a Mexican truck kills an
American in a highway accident. 92 When this scenario comes to
fruition, opposition groups will most likely seize the opportunity
to blame the tragedy on President Bush and instigate renewed
hostility toward the cross-border trucking provisions of
NAFTA.93 Such morbidity is evident in recent announcements
by public interest organizations that warn that "[t]he first time
the inevitable NAFTA truck crash happens, the Bush admini-
88. See Transportation Labor Endorses House Resolution to Keep Unsafe
Mexican Trucks and Buses Off U.S. Highways; U.S. NEWSWIRE (May 24, 2001),
available at 2001 WL 21894138.
89. See id.
90. Id.; see also Peter Szekely, AFL-CIO Urges Delay in Mexican Truck En-
try to U.S. (Feb. 15, 2001), at http://www.teamster.org/nafta/01naftaafl.htm.
91. See No Truck With Free Trade-Only the Truckers Gain from an Illegal
Ban on Mexican Trucks, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 4, 2001, at 35 [hereinafter No
Truck].
92. Kenneth Sheets, Truckin' Into a Treaty Flap, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Feb.19, 2001, at 48.
93. See id.
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stration is going to be in big trouble."94
This sensationalism attracts attention and garners some
support for NAFTA opposition among certain groups. Ironically,
it also enfeebles the safety justification by omitting other legiti-
mate arguments that should logically be recognized such as air
quality, drug trafficking, migrant labor smuggling, etc.9 5 The
absence of arguments against NAFTA based on other related is-
sues fortifies the position that the safety argument has been re-
peatedly used because its scandalous nature tends to dominate
the debate, infuriate the general public and obfuscate the issues.
The most potent opposition groups include public interest
organizations, organized labor associations such as the Team-
sters and the AFL-CIO and certain U.S. legislators. All of these
groups, in varying degrees, identify safety as the fundamental
reason to exclude Mexican trucks.9 6 This safety argument, how-
ever, seems slightly disingenuous once the potential ulterior mo-
tives of the aforementioned opposition groups are revealed.
A. POLITICAL MOTIVATION OF THE FORMER ADMINISTRATION
The safety justification given by the Clinton Administration
is widely believed to be a mere pretext for the real reasons to
halt cross-border trucking: political self-interest and protection
of U.S. jobs.97 In the months prior to the scheduled opening of
the border in December 1995, the DOT gave every indication it
94. Robert Collier, Ruling By NAFTA Tribunal Raises Fears for Highway
Safety, SAN FRANCIScO. CHRON., Feb.7, 2001, at A3.
95. See Julie Schneider, Ruling by NAFTA Tribunal Raises Fears for
Highway Safety, 8 Borderlines 5 (2000), available at httpJ/www.us-
mex.org/borderlines/ 2000/b167/b167.html. A recent study conducted in the San
Diego-Tijuana area demonstrates that, although commercial trucks accounted
for only four percent of use of highways, they produced eighty percent of the
dangerous particulate matter and twenty-five percent of the nitrous oxides.
Their lower air quality affects the entire community to such an extent that local
experts claim that "[c]learly, there are serious questions of public safety [involv-
ing the environmental and health problems involved." Id.; see also Senate Bill
Would Tie Approval of Truck Licenses to Drug Interdiction, 13 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 5 (Jan. 31, 1996), available at http://www.bna.coml
products/corplaw/itr.htm (on file with author) (noting how some legislators at-
tempted to use trucking access (which was already granted under NAFTA) as
leverage to force Mexico to increase drug enforcement); Ginger Thompson, Cash
Tempts Mexican Truckers to Hull Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2001, at A10
(discussing migrant labor smuggling).
96. See supra notes 60-90 and accompanying text.
97. See John Harrington, United States-Mexico Transportation Bill: Full




was planning to open the border as scheduled. 98 In September
1995, the Secretary of the DOT announced measures for safe
and efficient trucking operations under NAFTA and stated that
"the United States is determined that NAFTA is enacted prop-
erly and works right for each of our countries." 99 After inspect-
ing the crossing facilities in multiple border towns in early De-
cember 1995, and praising the cooperation between federal,
state and local agencies, representatives of the DOT announced
that "on December 18th, all three countries will be united in our
efforts to make our roads safer [and] as we open borders, this
spirit will help to ensure North America has the safest and most
efficient transportation system in the world - bar none."'100
Despite this message so oft repeated, the DOT announced the
day before the 1995 deadline that safety reasons precluded the
United States from opening the border.10 1
Critics of the last-minute refusal argue that the decision
was politically motivated, and that President Clinton yielded
under the pressure of labor unions such as the Teamsters in or-
der to ensure his reelection in 1996, and later in 2000 to assist
Al Gore's campaign. 10 2 This eleventh-hour reversal of plans,
from the perspective of free trade advocates, constituted a "vote-
grabbing tactic" designed to appease those associated with or-
ganized labor, and those who were fearful that the liberalization
of trucking would result in (i) a loss of profits to U.S. trucking
companies due to increased foreign competition, and (ii) a mas-
sive displacement of U.S. truck drivers by their Mexican coun-
terparts accustomed to earning lower salaries and benefits. 10 3
Opponents categorize this maneuver as simply veiled job protec-
tionism using safety concerns to intentionally undermine
NAFTA, a move that is "the last refuge of the desperate and
98. NAFTA Transition, supra note 11.
99. Id.
100. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Remarks Prepared for Delivery,
U.S. Secretary of Transportation Federico Pefia, Press Conference with Mex-
ico's Secretary of Communications and Transportation Carlos Rufz (Dec. 4,
1995) (on file with author); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Pefia
Assesses NAFTA Preparations: Gives California Group Its Funds to Ease
Truck Clearance at Border Crossings (Dec. 4, 1995) (on file with author).
101. Border Remarks, supra note 12; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Transp., Remarks Prepared for Delivery, U.S. Secretary of Transportation
Rodney E. Slater, Third U.S.-Mexico Border Infrastructure Conference, Ti-
juana, Mexico (June 3, 1999) (on file with author).
102. Harrington, supra note 97.
103. The Trucks That Hold Back NAFTA, THE ECONOMIST, Dec.11, 1997, at
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scurrilous."10 4
B. LEGISLATORS AND SPECIAL INTEREST DOLLARS
The motives of those legislators opposed to cross-border
trucking have also been scrutinized. Certain politicians advo-
cating the extension of the trucking moratorium have labeled
border inspection facilities "woefully inadequate,"105 while oth-
ers claim that opening the border pursuant to the NAFTA Panel
decision is "a disaster waiting to happen."10 6 Still others, upon
introducing legislation to completely bar Mexican trucks, argue
that "[w]e cannot allow NAFTA to open our borders and roll
over the public safety laws that keep American families safe."107
The authenticity of this clamor for safety seems suspect
when one examines the principal funding sources of those politi-
cians presenting the most fervent opposition. 108 According to a
recent study by the Center for Responsive Politics, many politi-
cal opponents of NAFTA receive the majority of their money
from labor organizations that are keenly interested in protecting
U.S. jobs. 0 9 Due to this economic influence, other groups have
categorized the safety argument as nothing more than a "politi-
cal smokescreen." 110
C. ORGANIZED LABOR AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
The Teamsters center their complaints on safety, calling it
"unacceptable" and "shocking" that Mexican trucks are allowed
to operate within designated commercial zones in the four bor-
der states since a total exclusion is imperative for "the safety
104. Davide Dukcevich, Mexican Truckers Win a Big One, FORBES, Feb.7,
2001, at 16, available at http://www.forbes.com/2001/02/07/0207global.html.
105. Members of Congress, Hoffa Urge Continued Restrictions on Mexican
Trucks, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1104 (June 30, 1999), available at
http://www.bna.com/products/corplaw/itr.htm (on file with author).
106. Elizabeth Walpole-Hofmeister, Teamsters, Leaders in Congress Urge
Bush to Go Slow in Implementing Trucking Rule, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 176
(Feb. 15, 2001), available at http'/www.bna.com/products/corplaw/itr.htm (on
file with author).
107. Rossella Brevetti, Rep. Brown Prepares Legislation to Keep Mexican
Trucks From Gaining NAFTA Access, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1363 (Sept. 7,
2000), available at httpJ/www.bna.com/products/corplaw/itr.htm (on file with
author).
108. See Mark Murray, Turned Back at the Border, THE NAT'L J., July 7,





and protection of the American public."11' It is frequently ar-
gued that the Teamsters' true motive is job protectionism.
This speculation is confirmed by declarations from the labor
unions themselves, whose campaign money and votes have con-
siderable influence in Washington. 1 2 As a representative of the
AFL-CIO explains it, "[organized labor's opinions especially
count on Capitol Hill, where reelection is job one."1 3 On several
occasions this group has warned that because the hourly rate of
Mexican drivers is lower than that in the United States,
"American trucking companies will simply close their U.S. facto-
ries and move their headquarters across the border.""1 4 The
Teamsters' claims are more likely economically motivated. As
reported by one journalist, "[c]haracterizations of Mexican
trucks wildly taking over U.S. highways are flights of fancy with
no basis in fact ... It's a tactic on the part of the Teamsters and
unions in general to scare the public .. .They're creating an en-
emy to build up their ranks."" 5
The Teamsters also have a history of action against cross-
border trucking. In 1991, they sued the Secretary of the DOT
over an agreement with Mexico allowing for reciprocal recogni-
tion of commercial drivers' licenses.116 In summarizing the ar-
guments of the Teamsters, the court clearly recognized that
then, like now, the Teamsters were actually motivated by pecu-
niary self-interest and job protectionism instead of safety." 7
The Teamsters asserted that they will suffer "both from the ex-
tra competition and from a possible increase in the number of
truck accidents; in their view, the [proposed agreement] threat-
ens both their pocketbooks and their safety."" 8The Teamster's vehemence illustrates the polarity of its
stance on safeguarding domestic drivers. 19 In reaction to the
contracting of one hundred foreign drivers by a U.S. company to
compensate for the unavailability of U.S. drivers, the Teamsters
111. Teamsters 2001, supra note 81.
112. See id.
113. Frank N. Wilner, Delivering Votes, J. OF COM. (June 14, 1999), at
http'//www.joc.com (on file with author).
114. Teamsters Asks DOT About Change in Highway Access for Mexican
Trucks, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1537 (Sept. 22, 1999), available at
http://www.bna.com/ products/corplaw/itr.htm (on file with author).
115. Id.
116. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Pena, 17 F.3d 1478, 1480 (1994).
117. Id. at 1483-86.
118. Id. at 1483.
119. See Frank N. Wilner, Island Truckers, J. OF COM. (July 5, 1999), at
httpJ/www.joc.com (on file with author).
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acted dismayed, claiming that "[iut is unbelievable that any
company needs to go outside of our borders to find skilled work-
ers [and] these hirings ... can only be seen as an effort to un-
dercut the middle class standard of living that the American
truck drivers enjoy."120 These statements are made notwith-
standing the current substantial shortage of qualified truck
drivers in the United States. 121 The job protectionism argument
is also suspect because Mexico has merely 375,000 trucks, while
over seven million U.S. trucks and drivers currently transit the
United States. 122
D. PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS
Certain public interest groups, such as Public Citizen, have
also been accused of obscuring their real motives for lobbying
the exclusion of Mexican trucks. 23 According to one skeptic who
criticizes Public Citizen, the validity of this group's information
should be scrutinized since its president is also on the board of
Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways (CRASH), an organiza-
tion that has traditionally assailed trucking while obtaining
substantial funding from the competing railroad industry.'2 4
More outspoken critics have also questioned certain public in-
terest organizations' motivations since they appear to be simply
"exploiting America's prejudice against Mexico to keep the
trucks out."125
IV. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF NAFTA TRUCKING
A. THE TRUCK-SAFETY ARGUMENT LACKS CREDIBILITY
Although opposition to cross-border trucking has been
highly publicized since the United States disregarded the first
120. Id.
121. See Clayton Boyce, Open Up, TRAFFIC WORLD, Feb. 19, 2001, available
at 2001 WL 7289805 (stating the job protectionism argument is unfounded
since there is already a shortage of drivers in United States); see also Rip Wat-
son, Contentious Rail, Truck Issues Face Congress, J. OF COM. (Oct. 12, 1999),
at http://www.joc.com (on file with author) (stating that other experts agree
that the Teamsters' unspoken argument of job protectionism is nonsense).
122. See No Truck, supra note 91, at 35.
123. See Boyce, supra note 121.
124. See id.
125. Paul de la Garza, Coming to U.S. Roads: More Mexican Trucks, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 27, 2001, at A2.
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NAFTA TRUCKING DISPUTE
NAFTA deadline in 1995, it is beneficial for the United States to
fulfill its obligations under NAFTA by permitting cross-border
trucking as soon as possible. The rationale used almost exclu-
sively by the opponents of cross-border trucking is that such ac-
tivity would be unsafe for those on U.S. roads. A more detailed
examination of the relevant facts shows this safety justification
seems to be of questionable merit.
1. Distorted Statistics Generate Inaccurate Conclusions
Parties opposed to cross-border trucking have repeatedly
used scare tactics regarding supposed safety hazards to engen-
der support for their position. As one expert explains, "[s]ome
press coverage has included predictions of doom and gloom, go-
ing so far as to suggest American highways will be in car-
nage."126 As genuine as the concern for public safety may be,
these emotive messages have been based, in large part, on
inaccurate statistics. 127  Citing the fact that failure rates
between U.S. and Mexican trucks are very similar, one expert
warned that "[iut should also be kept in mind that the safety
issue, as legitimately important as it is, has been somewhat
distorted."128 Other experts condemn the use of inappropriate
figures by NAFTA opponents, stating that such groups have em-
ployed safety statistics that upon close examination are "mis-
leading or incomplete."1 29 To better comprehend the distorted
nature of the truck-safety argument, it is imperative to under-
stand how goods are currently transported between the United
States and Mexico.
2. The Current Mexican Trucking System
Under the present system, the overwhelming majority of
Mexican trucks are unable to travel outside of designated com-
mercial zones in the four border states, so goods destined for the
United States are transported using a so-called drayage sys-
tem. 130 First, a Mexican long-haul truck transports the trailer of
126. Susan Kohn Ross, Customs Update: New Turn For Mexican Trucks?, J.
OF COM. (Feb. 22, 2001), at http://www.joc.online (on file with author).
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. Tim Weiner, In Rebuttal, Mexicans Dispute Claim Their Trucks Are
Unsafe, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2001, at Al.
130. See Teresa Puente, Mexico Trucking Fight Gears Up, CHi. TRIB., Aug.
27, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 4107757.
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goods to a drayage yard in Mexico located near the border. 131
Here, the goods are transferred to a Mexican short-haul truck (a
"Mexican Drayage Truck") utilized exclusively within the com-
mercial zones to transport goods across the border. 132 After
passing through customs and crossing the border, the Mexican
Drayage Truck enters a drayage yard in the United States,
whereupon the goods are relocated to a U.S. long-haul truck
that will transport the goods to their final destination in the
United States. 133 Free of cargo, the Mexican Drayage Truck re-
turns to Mexico.134
3. The Drayage System Skews Statistics
The three U.S. government studies described above indi-
cated that the failure rates for Mexican trucks at border inspec-
tion stations ranged from fifty percent in 1996 to thirty-six per-
cent in 1999.131 A failure due to a "safety violation" does not
necessarily involve actual hazards since violations can be issued
for relatively minor shortcomings. Failures include not display-
ing a DOT number, neglecting to obtain state permits, or not
maintaining driver logbooks and other documentation. 36 How-
ever, utilizing these statistics as a whole, opposition groups
have argued that Mexican trucks are unsafe and should be pro-
hibited from transiting U.S. roads.
The arguments of the opposition groups lack credibility for
several reasons. First, the vehicles producing such elevated
failure rates are exclusively Mexican Drayage Trucks, which are
intentionally maintained at minimum levels because they are
used strictly to transport goods for short distances within the
commercial zones. 37 As one expert explains it, "Mexican truck-
ers are not going to employ their newest equipment to sit in long
waiting lines in order to transport cargo only a few miles. It




134. See Jerry Pacheco, Issue of Mexican Trucks Dims U.S. Prestige,
ALBUQUERQUE J., July 30, 2001, at 5
135. See G.A.O. Report 1996, supra note 63; see also DOT Report 1998, su-
pra note 66; DOT Report 1999, supra note 8, at 23.
136. Debra Rose, U.S.-Mexico Trucking: Standoff at the Border Continues,
BORDERLINES, at http//www.us-mex.orgborderlines/2000/b167/bl67truck.html.




only the worst vehicles in a fleet should be used for drayage
purposes. According to trucking officials in Mexico, for instance,
"[niobody invests $100,000 for drayage [because] drayage is
where trucks go to die." 139 Still other experts explain that the
use of Mexican Drayage Trucks is essentially mandated by the
current rules, which, when using public safety as a goal, seem
counterintuitive.1 40 "The irony of the system is that it increases
the economic incentive to use less-safe trucks."141 Despite at-
tempts by opposition groups to argue the contrary position, the
evidence shows that the Mexican Drayage Trucks examined in
the three governmental studies are not representative of the
quality of the Mexican trucks in general. 142 The NAFTA Panel
decision., for example, explicitly stated:
Mexico and the United States agreed that Mexican trucks used for
drayage operations in the commercial zones tended to be older trucks
[and] Mexico submitted that the comparatively poorer condition of the
Mexican drayage trucks cannot be taken as an indicator for the condi-
tion of Mexican long-haul trucks.14s
4. The United States Has Similar Failure Rates
The safety argument relies on a one-sided analysis that
fails to address U.S. domestic trucking concerns. According to
the most recent government study, only thirty-six percent of
Mexican short-haul trucks, exclusively Drayage Trucks, failed
inspection at the border, while the failure rate for U.S. trucks
during the same period is twenty-five percent.144 The twenty-
five percent failure rate was obtained from inspections that
were conducted on mainly U.S. long-haul trucks.1 45 There is an
inherent logical fallacy in making a safety argument based on a
comparison between the best U.S. trucks and the worst Mexican
trucks.146 If comparable statistics were used, the condition of
U.S. short-haul trucks used to transport items to and from one
of the largest railroad hubs in the country would produce a fail-
139. Bill Mongelluzo, Safety Still Obstacle to Open Border, J. OF COM. (Oct.
22, 1999), at http;/www.joc.com (on file with author).
140. See No Truck, supra note 91.
141. Id.
142. See id. The only trucks used at the border are "short-hop rigs" used for
short distances.
143. Final Report, supra note 1.
144. Weiner, supra note 129, at 3.
145. See id.
146. See No Truck, supra note 91.
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ure rate of forty-five percent, which eclipses the thirty-six per-
cent failure rate of comparable Mexican Drayage Trucks. 147 The
report also indicates that U.S. long-haul trucks already have
considerable safety problems of their own, registering approxi-
mately 5,000 deaths per year during the last fifteen years due to
accidents. 148 Based on this more inclusive analysis of the avail-
able data, the true safety situation can be explained with a sim-
ple rhetorical question: "Will there be accidents in the U.S. in-
volving Mexican trucks? You can bet on it, just as there are
accidents every day involving American-owned-and-operated
trucks."1 49
5. Mexican Incentives to Use High-Quality Trucks
Assuming arguendo that Mexican Drayage Trucks do have
a significant failure rate, several business-related factors dictate
that Mexican companies would use only their long-haul trucks
of highest quality if they were able to operate in the United
States. "Those who wring their hands in anguish at the thought
of Mexican commercial trucks barreling down U.S. highways ig-
nore some facts. One is cold, hard cash." 150 It is argued that
once the border is liberalized, those Mexican companies desirous
of operating in the United States would send only their best
equipment and drivers in an attempt to avoid financial loss
caused by: (i) towing and repair costs for broken trucks; (ii)
spoilage of perishable items as a result of wrecks; (iii) increased
insurance rates due to accidents; and (iv) personal injury law-
suits in the United States. 151  Contrary to unsubstantiated
stereotypes, the degree of sophistication possessed by Mexican
business persons in the trucking industry is high:152
Mexico may seem like a quaint and backward place, and in many re-
gards it is. But the business interests helping to modernize that coun-
try are as shrewd as any on the planet. Their desire to profit from the
opportunities provided by NAFTA is the most reliable and enduring
reason why Mexican trucks traveling U.S. highways won't be danger-
147. Weiner, supra note 129, at 3.
148. Id.
149. Bring on the Trucks, COURIER J., Feb.10, 2001, at LEXIS-
NEXIS:AllSources/News/NewsGroupFile/MostRecentTwoYears.
150. Cold Cash Will Make Mexico's Trucks Safe; Businesses Won't Risk Prof-






6. No Major Problems with Mexican Trucks in the United States
to Date
Finally, the safety argument lacks merit based on a review
of actual experiences. While the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of
1982 served to deny access to the U.S. roads to the majority of
Mexican trucks, certain vehicles have been operating through-
out the United States for many years under one of the following
exceptions: (i) Mexico-domiciled trucks that have U.S. citizens
as majority owners, (ii) Mexico-domiciled, Mexican-owned
trucks "grandfathered" because they received operating author-
ity prior to the enactment of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act,
and (iii) Mexico-domiciled, Mexican-owned trucks that use the
United States as a "land bridge" to Canada, without stopping to
load or unload cargo. 54 Those advocating a complete restriction
on Mexican trucks have failed to provide any evidence suggest-
ing that the Mexican trucks currently operating in the United
States under these exceptions constitute an exceptional safety
threat.155
7. Mexican Trucking Standards Are Improving
Since the first discussions of NAFTA in 1992, Mexican
truck safety standards have considerably improved.15 6 Accord-
ing to a 2001 study conducted by the DOT, the failure rate for
Mexican Drayage Trucks has dropped by approximately twenty
percent during the last three years. 157 In addition, Mexico has
made some significant progress in establishing truck safety re-
quirements, including: (i) enacting regulations requiring all
drivers to log hours of service; (ii) issuing truck inspection stan-
153. Id.
154. DOT Report 1999, supra note 8.
155. See No Truck, supra note 91, at 36 (noting that a 1999 study conducted
by the DOT indicated that Mexican trucks that were caught illegally going be-
yond the commercial zones had a failure rate of thirty percent, whereas U.S.
trucks operating legally in the United States had nearly the same failure rate,
at twenty-five percent).
156. See OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. AUDIT REPORT:
Interim Report on Status of Implementing the North American Free Trade
Agreement's Cross-Border Trucking Provisions, Rep. No. MH-2001-059 (May 8,
2001), available at http'//www.oig.dot.gov/item-details.php?item=398.
157. Id.
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dards; (iii) automating its information systems for trucks, driv-
ers and cargo; (iv) implementing procedures for administering
drug and alcohol tests harmonized between United States and
Mexico; and (v) establishing medical requirements for obtaining
a commercial drivers' license. 158
According to a recent report by the World Bank, "[i]mproved
vehicle standards will better position Mexican transport indus-
try to compete under NAFTA."159 Although trucking standards
have obviously improved in recent years and serve to weaken
the safety argument espoused by NAFTA opponents, Mexican
officials claim that safety standards will naturally advance even
more once access to the United States is granted. 160 Once the
border is opened "the safety of the Mexican fleet would improve
dramatically because truckers would be forced to meet safety
standards in return for access. You have to give them [an] in-
centive to modernize."16'
B. THE BORDER STATES ARE PREPARED TO ENSURE SAFETY
The four U.S. border states most directly affected by cross-
border trucking are working to handle the potential increase in
cross-border trucking operations and intensified border inspec-
tions. "U.S. border states would like Washington assistance [be-
cause] while benefiting from NAFTA-related trade, these states
do not want to be left with the entire bill for enforcing safety for
trucks that may be headed all over the U.S."162 These pleas for
economic aid, however, by no means indicate that the border
states are opposed to cross-border trucking because of safety. In
conjunction with certain trucking industry organizations, these
state politicians explained that the "[ciontinued imposition of
the freeze has strained our relations with Mexico, stymied reso-
lution of other essential bilateral transportation issues and de-
nied the United States the benefits of expanded trade." 63 Like-
158. Id.
159. The Transport Sector in Mexico: An Evaluation, World Bank Group,
Rep. No. 18153 (June 30, 1998), at http://www.worldbank.org.
160. See Lorraine Woellert, Mexican Trucks: Unsafe at Any Speed?, BUS.
WK. ONLINE (Jan. 15, 1999), at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/
jan1998/ nf90115d.htm.
161. Id.
162. Mexico Wins Award on Cross-Border Trucks, 8 INTER-AM. TRADE REP.
2029 (Mar. 12, 2001) (on file with author).
163. Rossella Brevetti, Trucking Provision Implementation Urged by Indus-
try, State Officials, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 27 (Jan. 1, 1997), available at
http'//vww.bna.com/products/corplaw/itr.htm (on file with author); see also
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wise, other commentators have determined that the irritation of
the politicians of the four border states with the prolonged delay
of cross-border trucking actually surpasses that felt by Mex-
ico.'6 The board of governors of these states categorizes the
safety argument as "bogus" since "road safety is a state mat-
ter... and one which [the border states] are fully prepared to
handle. 165
C. THE INEVITABILITY OF PAYMENT AND PROPER CANALIZATION
OF U.S. FUNDS
The NAFTA Panel was unambiguous in its determination
that the blanket refusal by the United States to consider appli-
cations from Mexican trucks constituted a breach of Annex I of
NAFTA. 166 Based on its findings, the dispute resolution panel
mandated that the United States take "appropriate steps" to
bring its practices regarding cross-border trucking services into
compliance with NAFTA within thirty days.167 If the United
States refuses to comply, it would face retaliatory measures and
economic penalties by Mexico, which may reach $200 billion.' 68
The United States has two options: (i) allow access to Mexican
trucks that meet U.S. safety standards on the basis of a case-by-
case inspection, or (ii) disregard its NAFTA obligations (tempo-
rarily or permanently) and suffer the economic and political re-
percussions.169
Mexican officials initially displayed leniency after the Bush
Administration announced that it would take all actions neces-
sary to comply with the NAFTA Panel decision as soon as possi-
ble. This clemency evaporated as fierce opposition to cross-
border trucking manifested itself in Congress through the Sabo
and Murray Amendments. 70 The Mexican government has
stated, for example, that failure by the United States to comply
Bush wants to Open Borders to Mexican Trucks, COMM. CARRIER J. (Mar. 1,
2001), available at 2001 WNL 16614056 (noting that while governor of Texas,
George W. Bush wanted Mexican trucks to be allowed into the U.S.).
164. See The Trucks That Hold Back NAFTA, supra note 103.
165. Id.
166. See Final Report, supra note 1.
167. See id.
168. See Daniel McCosh, DOT, Mexico Talk Trucks, J. OF COM. (Mar. 22,
2001), at www.joc.com (on file with author).
169. See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, NAFTA Panel Rejects U.S. Contraints on
Mexico Trucks: The Bush Administration Must Decide Whether to Allow Full
Access or to Pay Compensation, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2001, at Al.
170. See Larson, supra note 28.
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with the ruling of the NAFTA Panel would leave this nation "no
choice but to take measures in response.' 171 Mexico has consid-
ered: (i) the closing of the Mexican border to all U.S. trucks,172
(ii) seeking a fine of some $200 billion, 173 (iii) introducing new
tariffs on U.S. exports of fructose sweetener to Mexico, 174 and
(iv) denying access to various Mexican markets. 175 Such meas-
ures would allow Mexico to salvage at least some national dig-
nity and prevent Mexico from continuing to be a "joke" in the
United States. 176
The threat of economic sanctions does not change the stance
of all interest groups in the United States. Organized labor, for
example, holds firm on their commitment to keep border access
restricted, regardless of potential political and economic conse-
quences. They center their objections on trucker and motorist
safety, an issue more vibrant to the average driver than the in-
direct threat of NAFTA sanctions.177 Likewise, other labor
groups have contended that "[any trade sanctions that the U.S.
may face as a result of this dispute resolution process cannot
outweigh the safety of American highway users." T7 Certain
politicians have argued that "given the seriousness of the high-
way safety issues involved.., the United States should refuse
to lift its current restrictions and accept the fines that then
would be imposed for failure to comply with the panel's deci-
sion. "179
171. Edwin Chen, White House, Decry Truck Vote, L.A. TIMES, June 28,
2001, at A22; see also John Nagle & Rossella Brevetti, Mexico to Suspend Trade
Benefits if United States Ignores Truck Panel Decision, 18 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 253 (Feb. 15, 2001), available at http'//www.bna.com/products/corplaw/
itr.htm (on file with author).
172. See Cierre de Fronteras a Camiones de EU Pide Senador, EL
FINANcIERO, Aug. 7, 2001, at http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx.
173. See McCosh, supra note 168.
174. See Mary Jordan, Mexican Truckers Protest Red Light at U.S. Border,
WASH. POST, July 14, 2001, at A14.
175. See Mexico May Block Trucks From U.S., WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2001, at
A13; see also Peter J. Cazamias, The U.S.-Mexican Trucking Dispute: A Prod-
uct of a Politicized Trade Agreement, 33 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 349, 356 (1998).
176. See Chumacero Quintero, Mdxico amenaza con cerrar las fronteras a los
camions de EU, EL ECONOMISTA, Aug. 3, 2001, at
httpv/www.eleconomista.com.mx (last visited Feb. 13, 2002).
177. See Press Release, supra note 86 (noting how a spokesperson for one labor
organization argued that "[i]t doesn't matter whether this faceless NAFTA panel
fines the U.S. $1 million or $10 million.. .You can't put a price on human life.")
178. See id.
179. Rep. Brown Introduces Resolution Urging Continued Limits on Mexi-
can Truck Access, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (1526) (Oct. 5, 2000), available at
http'//www.bna.com/products/corplaw/itr.htm (on file with author).
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While this defiance may appear admirable and even patri-
otic at first glance, public policy mandates a contrary result.
First, the fines imposed by Mexico could reach exorbitant
amounts (i.e., ranging up to $200 billion). 80 Second, as ex-
plained in detail below, the reluctance to obey treaty obligations
would undoubtedly damage the U.S. image in the international
political arena.'8 ' Third, one way or another, the United States
will suffer economic loss as a result of the NAFTA Panel deter-
mination if they do not comply with the ruling.18 2 Faced with
this eventuality, U.S. government funds would be better di-
rected at constructing new inspection facilities, hiring additional
enforcement personnel, developing highway infrastructure, etc.,
as opposed to maintaining the status quo and simply paying
Mexico to cease and desist.18 3 The United States should live up
to its NAFTA agreements while concurrently ensuring that
trucks from Mexico are safe.'84 If this requires additional gov-
ernment resources, at least the money "is better spent on en-
forcement of safety regulations than on payment of trade sanc-
tion penalties."18 5 Finally, the real persons injured by this one-
sided safety rationale are U.S. consumers who will be forced to
pay higher prices because the transportation costs added to the
merchandise will continue to be unnecessarily elevated. 8 6 Rep-
resentatives from the U.S. trucking industry also adhere to this
position. As one person explains, "long lines at the border mean
wasted time at the border which raises the cost of shipping
goods for my customers... They pass this increased cost along
to the consumer, who is the real victim of the border transporta-
tion inefficiencies that exist today."18 7
D. AVOID ALIENATING ALL NAFTA PARTNERS
Canada was not directly involved in this dispute because
180. See McCosh, supra note 168.
181. See infra Part IV(C).
182. See Brendan M. Case, Fox Warns of Ban of U.S. Trucks, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 3, 2001, at 10, available at 2001 WL 26639691 (noting
that in lieu of adopting trade sanctions, Mexico has threatened to close the bor-
der to U.S. trucks).
183. See Boyce, supra note 121.
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. See David Hendricks, Enact All of NAFTA Sooner, Rather than Later,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESs-NEWS, Oct. 13, 1999, at El.
187. ATA, NITL, Chamber of Commerce Protest NAFTA Crossing Delay,
HAZMAR TRANSPORT NEWS, Dec. 24, 1996, available at 1996 WL 7902834.
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the trucking moratorium imposed under the Bus Regulatory Re-
form Act of 1982 was not applicable to Canada. 88 Nonetheless,
due to its keen interest in the issue, Canada exercised its right
to participate in the NAFTA arbitration.18 9 Concurring with
Mexico's position in its submission to the NAFTA Panel, Canada
reasoned that the blanket refusal by the United States to allow
Mexican trucks to acquire authorization to operate on U.S.
roads constituted discriminatory treatment, thereby violating
the NAFTA provisions regarding cross-border services. 190 The
Canadian Trucking Alliance also opposed the U.S. stance, de-
scribing the situation as "archaic."191 This group also stated
that U.S. action has minimized the effectiveness of the treaty by
limiting the ability of truckers from all three NAFTA countries
to take "full advantage" of the potential growth in trade on the
continent. 192
Straining and perhaps irreparably damaging the United
States' relationship with one NAFTA partner as a result of the
trucking dispute is lamentable. Simultaneously damaging the
rapport with the only remaining NAFTA partner would be fool-
hardy. In their respective submissions to the NAFTA Panel,
both Mexico and Canada expressly chastised U.S. actions. 193
Accordingly, public policy should discourage the United States
from alienating both of its NAFTA partners over the cross-
border trucking issue.
E. THE UNITED STATES IS LEGALLY OBLIGATED TO COMPLY
WITH NAFTA PANEL
According to the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, all treaties made under the authority of the
United States shall be the "supreme law of the land" and enjoy
legal superiority over any conflicting provision of a state consti-
tution or law. 94 NAFTA took effect on January 1, 1994.195 At
this time, due to its status as a treaty, the provisions contained
therein became the "supreme law of the land" of the United
188. See Memorandum, supra note 7.
189. See NAFTA, supra note 9, at art. 2013.
190. See Final Report, supra note 1.
191. See NAFTA Not Living Up to Promise, CTA Says, MOD. BULK
TRANSPORTER, Nov. 30, 2000, available at 2000 WL 12749465.
192. Id.
193. See Final Report, supra note 1, at 21-45.
194. See U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2.
195. See Harrington, supra note 97.
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States.196 The United States agreed to, among other things,
permit cross-border trucking pursuant to a predetermined
schedule and to resolve any disputes in accordance with the
mechanisms provided for in NAFTA. 197 In February 2001, the
NAFTA Panel held that the United States had violated its
treaty obligations and mandated that it quickly take "appropri-
ate steps" to rectify its practices. 198 Thus, initiatives to prolong
the trucking moratorium in light of the circumstances are a con-
travention of both international treaty obligations and sound
public policy. As one U.S. legislator said:
NAFTA is now the law of the land. It is the treaty between our
neighbors and us... NAFTA says we are going to open the borders up
to Mexico and Canada. This President says January of next year is
when we do it. This amendment would prohibit [trucks] from Mexico
to enter the United States. Period. You cannot do that. You are in
violation of a treaty; in violation of the law; in violation of the majority
that passed the treaty through this body.199
Adhering to this line of reasoning, groups such as the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce have underscored the importance of ful-
filling a promise, arguing that "[tihe United States made a sol-
emn commitment under NAFTA to open its border to Mexican
trucks - just as Mexico promised to do for American trucks. It's
time we both kept our word." 00 Albeit expensive and arduous to
comply with NAFTA, the answer is not to simply ignore trade
agreements because implementation is difficult.201
F. THE HYPOCRISY OF PROPOSED U.S. NONCOMPLIANCE
In describing the Bush Administration's trade agenda, the
office of the U.S. Trade Representative emphasized this nation's
intolerance of treaty violations. Recent reports by the agency
demonstrate "the importance of vigilant monitoring of U.S.
trade agreements and quick responses to noncompliance - in-
196. See U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2.
197. See NAFTA, supra note 9, at Annex I.
198. Final Report, supra note 1, at 81.
199. See Comments, supra note 41, at H3587.
200. Press Release, United States Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber
Hails Opening of Mexican Border to Trucks- NAFTA Ruling is Good For Busi-
ness (Feb. 7, 2001) (on file with author); see also Press Release, United States
Chamber of Commerce, Chamber Applauds Ruling on Trucking Dispute with
Mexico (Dec.1, 2000) (on file with author).
201. See Paul Magnusson, Lift the Roadblocks to Mexican Trucks, BUS. WK.
ONLINE (Feb. 13, 2001), at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflashl
feb2001nf20010213_330.htm.
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cluding the use of WTO and NAFTA dispute settlement proce-
dures."20 2 Moreover, if the United States is to maintain an effec-
tive trade policy, U.S. citizens must have confidence that inter-
national trade is fair and beneficial to them. 20 3 This requires,
among other things, "ensuring that other countries live up to
their obligations under the trade agreements they sign. '204
In light of these and similar announcements, U.S. refusal to
adhere to its NAFTA commitments regarding trucking appears
to be unjustifiable hypocrisy. The contradiction in U.S. trade
policy is disturbingly clear. "We are clearly violating our own
agreement... We are doing something that is not one whit bet-
ter than what we criticize in other countries."2 5 Clinging to
such double standards in terms of treaty compliance could prove
detrimental to the United States in several manners. By refus-
ing to concede on the relatively discreet issue of cross-border
trucking, the United States has essentially opened "Pandora's
box" allowing either of the other NAFTA parties to disregard
virtually any other provision using similar arguments. 2 6 Until
this "blemish" regarding NAFTA implementation is rectified,
"the U.S. is in a difficult position when arguing for other coun-
tries to follow particular trade rules."207 This decision, further-
more, may prejudice the success of future trade agreements be-
cause they are designed to provide the legal and financial
predictability sought by international investors. 208 The instabil-
ity generated by this trucking dispute will likely thwart invest-
ment under NAFTA and other international agreements. 20 9
202. Press Release, Office of United States Trade Representative Executive
Office of the President, U.S.T.R. Releases Reports Emphasizing Enforcement
Priorities (Apr. 30, 2001) (on file with author).
203. Press Release, Executive Office of the President, Identification of Trade
Expansion Priorities Pursuant to Executive Order 131164 (Apr. 30, 2001) (on
file with author).
204. Id.
205. Carter Dougherty, Truck Stop? U.S. Seen Apt to Lose Big-Rig Fight to
Mexico, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2000, at B8.
206. Mexico and United States Examine Trucking Safety Review Process, 13
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 680 (April 24, 1996), available at http://www.bna.com/
products/corplaw/itr.htm (on file with author) (referring to comments made by
Don Michie, chair of a BTA transportation committee).
207. Harrington, supra note 97.
208. See id. at 6.
209. According to this group, the delay in implementing the cross-border
trucking provisions of NAFTA is a "thorn" in the U.S. position that NAFTA is
an example of a rule-based trading system. Politically, it is important to give
confidence to investors that rules will not be changed arbitrarily. Id.
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G. ADHERENCE TO ESTABLISHED U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Compliance with NAFTA Panel decisions is consistent not
only with domestic policy, but also with well-established U.S.
foreign policy for a number of reasons. First, facilitating cross-
border trucking would generally further the free trade agenda
so commonly espoused by the current presidential administra-
tion.210 According to White House representatives, the introduc-
tion of political initiatives such as the Sabo Amendment consti-
tutes a "troubling sign of isolationism on [Capitol] Hill" whose
supporters are "economic isolationists and false purveyors of
fright and retreat."211 The refusal by the United States to rec-
ognize the cross-border trucking provisions has been viewed as
the most recent "free trade fraud," and effectively supporting
the free trade agenda requires more than political rhetoric. 212
Diverse representatives have announced that the U.S. gov-
ernment is dedicated to complying with the NAFTA Panel deci-
sion. It has been stated, for instance, that "President Bush has
made a firm commitment to implement NAFTA trucking provi-
sions '213 and that the U.S. government has "assured the Mexi-
can government that we intend to live up to our NAFTA obliga-
tion to open the U.S.-Mexico border to trucking."214
Implementing the NAFTA trucking provisions would afford the
Bush Administration the opportunity to fulfill its promise to
Mexican officials, thereby elevating the trustworthiness of the
President.215
The failure to live up to obligations in the trucking dispute
will likely hinder any expansion of NAFTA.216 Chile, for exam-
ple, suspended talks with NAFTA signatories and opted instead
to become an associate member of MERCOSUR, in part due to
its "growing impatience with the United States' internal politi-
210. Dana Milbank & Helen Dewar, Ban on Mexican Trucks Called 'Isola-
tionist' Sign, WASH. POST, July 31, 2001, at AS.
211. Id.
212. Gary M.Galles, Undermining Free Trade by Stalling Mexican Trucks,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 28, 1999, at B9.
213. Brevetti, supra note 32.
214. Larson, supra note 28, at 4.
215. See Marcela Sanchez, U.S. Risks Losing Credibility on Trade, WASH.
POST, July 25, 2001, at A4 (explaining that although President Bush has dem-
onstrated a significant personal interest and commitment to Latin American
trade issues, the difficulty implementing the NAPTA trucking provisions seri-
ously undermines the credibility of the U.S. going into a trade agreement).
216. See Michael R. Skahan, The NAFTA Trucking Dispute wih Mexico:
Problem? What Problem?, 5 NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 603, 603 (1999).
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cal squabbles" and the perceived deficiencies of the NAFTA pro-
visions related to trucking.217
Adherence to the cross-border trucking provisions also com-
ports with the obligation of the United States to integrate trans-
portation throughout the entire hemisphere.218 As part of the
Western Hemisphere Transport Initiative of the Free Trade
Area of the Americas, the United States is already committed to
working toward facilitating truck transportation throughout the
two American continents. 219 Improving transportation within
the NAFTA region first, therefore, could serve as a paradigm for
larger scale development in the near future. Moreover, the
trucking dispute weakens the credibility of NAFTA as an ap-
propriate instrument for economic development because it un-
dermines investor confidence, which is based on predictability
and security.220
Finally, U.S. foreign policy dictates that the cross-border
provisions be recognized by the United States immediately in
order to preserve the benefits thus far achieved under NAFTA
and to safeguard the tight interrelationship between the United
States and Mexico. 221 Since NAFTA's inception, annual house-
hold savings have increased by approximately $2,000, some
thirteen million jobs have been created, and trade with Mexico
217. Id.
218. See The Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), FAL Bulletin 149, Transportation in the 21st Cen-
tury: A Vision for the Integration (1999), at http://www.eclac.org/ Trans-
porte/noticias/bolfalI 6/5106/Fall49eng.htm.
219. The primary objective of the Western Hemisphere Transport Initiative
is to
integrate air, land and sea transportation policies and practices both across
modes and between countries in the Western Hemisphere, through im-
proved planning in the development and maintenance of transportation in-
frastructure, the linking of regional and subregional transportation institu-
tions and systems, and the sharing of information on 'best practices' in
utilizing traditional and innovative financing mechanisms.
Id.; see also The Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean (ECLAC), FAL Bulletin 143, Integrated Transport Systems in
Latin America and the Caribbean: Converging Initiatives (1998) (explaining
that plans for multimodal transport are also underway in South and Central
America).
220. See Jimmie V. Reyna et al., Cross-Border Movement of Goods: Devel-
opments in U.S.-Mexico Customs Procedures, 7 U.S.-MEx. L. J. 169, 174 (1999).
221. The majority of Mexico's "international" issues are really "North
American" issues because of this nation's physical proximity to the United
States, and the increasingly integrated economic and social structures of these
two countries. G. POPE ATKINS, LATIN AMERICA IN THE INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL SYSTEM 30 (3rd ed. 1995).
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has reached over $250 billion per year.222 Based on these accom-
plishments, "[t]he success of NAFTA underscores the impor-
tance of expanding free trade throughout the hemisphere... As
Latin America grows, the United States benefits."223 On a lar-
ger scale, other benefits of NAFTA have occurred, such as insti-
tutional development of environmental organizations, research
centers and civic organizations. 224 President Bush understands
what Mexico means both to the United States and the rest of
Latin America, evidenced by one of his common campaign slo-
gans: "What is good for Mexico is good for the United States."225
According to experts, the moratorium on cross-border trucking
involves much broader issues since over eighty-five percent of
the goods sold between these two nations are transported by
trucks. It is argued, in particular, that "[c]ontinued imposition
of the freeze has strained our relations with Mexico [and] sty-
mied resolution of other essential bilateral transportation is-
sues . .. 226
H. THE INCREASE IN CROSS-BORDER TRUCKING WILL BE
MINIMAL
Opponents have attempted to instill fear in the collective
mind of the U.S. public by claiming that, upon the opening of
the border, Mexican trucks would literally flood the U.S. roads
and imperil the lives of all persons transiting thereon. 227 Albeit
attention-grabbing, this eventuality can be refuted.
1. The Mexican Perspective
Cross-border trucking pursuant to NAFTA is extremely un-
222. Press Release, Executive Office of the President, Joint Statement of the
NAFTA Free Trade Commission Building on a North American Partnership
(July 31, 2001) (on file with author).
223. Robert B. Zoellick, Free Trade and the Hemispheric Hope, Prepared
Remarks at the Council of the Americas (May 7, 2001), at http://www.ustr.gov/
speech-test/zoellick/zoellick_2.html.
224. See Sidney Weintraub, NAFTA Evaluation, INT'L POL. ECON. (Aug.
2000), at http'J/www.csis.org/americas/pubs/weintraubnewsletters082000.html.
225. Ron Fournier, Bush Keeps Training Wheels on Foreign Policy with
Mexico Trip, A.P. WORLDSTREAM, Feb. 15, 2001, at LEXIS-NEXIS: News-
GroupFile/MostRecentTwoYears.
226. Brevetti, supra note 163, at 27 (quoting Edward Emmet, National In-
dustrial Transportation League President).
227. See Press Release, Teamsters, Hoffa Joins Members of Congress to Op-
pose NAFTA Ruling (Feb. 8, 2001) (on file with author).
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attractive for several reasons. The vast majority of Mexican
truckers oppose opening the border because they fear that they
would be ill-equipped to compete against their U.S. counter-
parts.228 It is argued, for example, that "[i]t's never going to
make economic sense to send Mexican trucks to New York or
Chicago. No way. It would be more practical for us to close up
all our operations and reincorporate in the United States' and
that is a highly unlikely prospect."229 This position is shared by
the preeminent Mexican trucking association, which argues that
the "the border should remain closed, because it would be im-
possible for Mexican truckers to compete."230 This alleged in-
ability to compete with U.S. truckers is attributable to the sub-
standard transportation infrastructure in Mexico, which forces
Mexican truckers to spend approximately thirty percent of their
earnings on maintenance. 231 Mexican truckers argue that their
inaccessibility to reasonable truck financing also places them at
a competitive disadvantage. 232 Mexican trucking companies
"are crippled by far higher interest rates and shorter payment
terms" than U.S. firms.233 Based on this anxiousness about com-
peting with U.S. trucks, Mexican trucking organizations have
requested that the Mexican government postpone the opening of
the border for a period of five years, despite the NAFTA Panel
ruling in Mexico's favor. 234
228. Weiner, supra note 129, at Al and A8.
229. Id.
230. The largest Mexican trucking organization, The National Cargo Trans-
port Chamber (CANACAR), accuses the Mexican government of acting in a
manner detrimental to Mexican truckers in order to protect its reputation. As
representatives of CANACAR explain it, the government lobbies for opening
the border "to keep their prestige intact," yet the local truckers oppose this
move because of fears of foreign competition. Alan Stowell and John Nagel, In-
terim NAFTA Panel Report Tells U.S. to Allow Mexican Trucks to Operate, 17
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1837 (Dec. 7, 2000), available at http://www.bna.com/
products/corplaw/itr.htm (on file with author) (quoting Antonio Vazquez,
spokesperson for CANACAR).
231. See Antonio Sdnchez, Esperan Transportistas que les Cumplan,
REFORMA, Mar. 19, 2001, at httpJ/www.reforma.com/negocios-y-dinero/ ar-
ticulo/080403/.
232. See Mexico Threatens Import Ban Over Truck Snub, J. OF COM. (June
28, 2001), at httpJ/www.joc.com (on file with author).
233. Id.
234. See Se Agranda el Problema de Transportistas, EL INFORMADOR -




2. DOT Trucking Regulations
In addition to these declarations by Mexican truckers and
industry leaders, the notion that the liberalization of the border
will have only a minor effect on continental trucking is con-
firmed in the recent DOT Trucking Regulations. The proposed
rules estimate that a mere 3,200 Mexican trucks will apply for
permits during the first year.235 Of these, seventy-five percent
will solicit a permit using Form OP-2, which restricts movement
of the Mexican trucks to the four border states.236 Expressed in
a different manner, these DOT Trucking Regulations predict
that, even if cross-border trucking were allowed under NAFTA,
only eight hundred new Mexican trucks per year would be
transporting goods in the United States. 237 The insignificance of
this number is clear when one realizes that some seven million
U.S. trucks and drivers currently operate on U.S. roads. Based
on the foregoing, even if cross-border trucking were immediately
available, the increase in Mexican trucks transiting U.S. high-
ways would be negligible.
V. DOT TRUCKING REGULATIONS CONSTITUTE A
FEASIBLE SOLUTION
Even if the truck-safety concern was legitimate and a sig-
nificant increases of Mexican trucks on U.S. roads were prob-
able, such apprehensions should be completely mitigated by the
DOT Trucking Regulations. First, a Mexican truck must un-
dergo a mandatory "safety review" by the DOT in order to obtain
conditional operating authority, which consists of making spe-
235. The FMCSA considers 3,200 to be the high estimate for permit applica-
tions, and assumes that the number will fall to 2,500 applicants per year after
the first year of implementation. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration,
66 Fed. Reg. 86,22331 (proposed May 3, 2001) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts.
368 & 387).
236. Id. (The remaining twenty-five percent will apply for OP-1 (MX) au-
thority).
237. The proposed regulations indicate that, after the first year, only six
hundred twenty-five Mexican trucks will solicit permits on an annual basis. Id.
According to the rules, this limited number is attributable to two factors. First,
the majority of large Mexican trucking companies that benefit from U.S. opera-
tions presumably have authorization to operate within the commercial zones.
Id. Second, some new applicants may desire to take advantage of operating in
the United States, but the majority of them lack the financial and administra-
tive capacity to do so. Id.
20021
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
cific certifications regarding the trucking company's ability to
comply with U.S. safety regulations. 238 Upon the satisfactory
completion of the safety review, the Mexican truck is granted a
provisional operating permit that is valid for eighteen
months.239 During that eighteen month period, the DOT will
collect safety and operational data on the Mexican truck, moni-
toring traffic violations, accidents, insurance coverage and other
relevant information. 240 If significant safety problems are de-
tected, then the DOT would take immediate action to either en-
sure that the problematic truck come into compliance or remove
the provisional operating permit.241 After sufficient safety and
operational data has been compiled on a particular Mexican
truck, for example after approximately twelve months, it is
forced to submit to an obligatory "safety audit" by the DOT 242
Unlike the initial "safety review," this investigation is not based
on affidavits by the Mexican applicant.243 Instead, the DOT con-
ducts an investigation at the Mexican truck's base in Mexico or
at specially-designed offices at the U.S.-Mexico border.244 Fi-
nally, if the vehicle successfully passes the in-depth safety au-
dit, the DOT will award a permanent operating authority.245
In order to implement these DOT Trucking Regulations, the
Bush Administration's budget for fiscal year 2002 contains "an
unprecedented increase in funds" to augment inspection per-
sonnel and facilities.246 For example, in terms of staff, the
budget includes approximately $30 million allocated for the hir-
ing of additional federal and state inspectors to reach a total of
nearly 500.247 This amount of inspectors represents a ten-fold
increase since 1995 and clearly surpasses the number of inspec-
tors called for in the three government studies mentioned ear-
lier.248 With regard to facilities, the DOT budget includes over
238. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text; see also Transportation
Chief on Safety of Mexican Trucks in U.S. (July 18, 2001), at
httpJ/usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/mexico/safetyl8.htm (statement of the Hon-
orable Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary of Transportation) [hereinafter State-
ment].












$50 million for the construction and/or improvement of state in-
spection stations.249 In addition to these measures, the DOT
Trucking Regulations require this agency to conduct a series of
safety seminars designed to educate Mexican truckers and com-
panies about complying with the new rules. 2
5 0
CONCLUSION
For a period of over five years, the United States has been
in violation of its NAFTA obligations regarding cross-border
services. In an attempt to rationalize this continuous transgres-
sion, opposition groups and previous presidential administra-
tions have cited the alleged unsafe condition of Mexican trucks
and drivers. As this article demonstrates, however, the truck-
safety argument lacks credibility for a multitude of reasons.
Based on the evidence, it is clear that even if the border is liber-
alized pursuant to NAFTA, the amount of Mexican trucks that
intend to operate in the United States is miniscule. For those
that do, the proposed DOT Trucking Regulations establish a
procedure designed to ensure the roadworthiness of Mexican
trucks and the qualifications of their drivers.
Under international treaty law, the United States is abso-
lutely required to comply with the NAFTA provisions related to
cross-border services. Accordingly, instead of paying enormous
fines to further extend the trucking moratorium, facing retalia-
tory trade measures by Mexico, and hypocritically disregarding
well-established U.S. foreign trade policy, the United States
should take all actions necessary to foster cross-border trucking
as soon as practicable. The initial step should be the enactment
of the DOT Trucking Regulations, which would serve to ensure
safety on U.S. roads and compliance with NAFTA.
249. Id.
250. The comprehensive safety enforcement program of the DOT has five
basic elements, including: (i) a safety review of Mexican trucks before granting
a provisional operating authority, (ii) an expanded vehicle inspection regime
made possible by increased inspection personnel and facilities, (iii) safety au-
dits of drivers to assure compliance with licensing, hours of service rules, etc.,
(iv) considerable border infrastructure improvements, and (v) educational com-
pliance programs on both sides of the border. According to Mineta, a true un-
derstanding of the DOT Trucking Regulations is necessary to resolve the de-
bates because "the actual safety considerations in implementing our NAFTA
obligations are very different from the picture painted by some opponents." Id.
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